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PURSUING "PEACE" IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE
By Maia Hallward*
INTRODUCTION
Nine years after the outbreak of the second intifada (uprising) in
September 2000 and sixteen years after the signing of the Oslo Accords in
September 1993, Israelis and Palestinians seem as far as ever from a final
status agreement. Diplomatic efforts by the George W. Bush
administration—notably the Performance-Based Road Map to Peace and the
2007 Annapolis Conference—avoided the core confiict issues, and delayed
such negotiations by emphasizing "provisional" borders.' Not only do such
tactics allow more time for consolidating "facts on the ground" that can
prejudice final status negotiations, but the lack of a political horizon undercuts
moderates working to "sell" peace to the public.^ Military approaches to
solving the confiict have also failed to achieve results. Qassam rocket attacks
from Gaza have resulted in dire poverty from an on-going siege of the Strip,
while Israel's military attempts to secure the release of soldiers captured by
Hamas and Hezbollah in 2006 have failed, bringing condemnation of the
govemment's war effort.' The intense conflict in Gaza and Southem Israel
during Operation "Cast Lead" (December27,2008-January 28,2009) resulted
in over 1300 Palestinian deaths, four Israeli deaths, not to mention the
thousands of Palestinians and scores of Israelis who were injured."
Several problems exist in mainsfream scholarly and media coverage
of the Israeli-Palestinian confiict and efforts to "manage" or "resolve" it.' First,
there is little consideration given to what the term "peace" means to Israelis
and Palestinians, who not only tend to have quite different views regarding the
notion but also view it as a "dirty" word given the failures of the Oslo "peace"
process. Second, the focus tends to be on conflict and on failures or obstacles
rather than on the Israelis and Palestinians who continue to work nonviolently
for a just, lasting, and secure peace between the peoples. While it is important
to identify the obstacles to a durable, negotiated settlement at the official level
so that scholars, policy makers and practitioners can address those challenges,
"success" stories from groups that have persisted in pursuing peace even in
times of violent confiict can similariy assist in the effort. Not only can the
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experiences of such groups inform policy choices by Israeli and Palestinian
political actors, but news of such groups' efforts can work to ameliorate the
negative stereotypes prevalent in both societies and the "no partner" narrative
that dominates the discourse. Mainstream media coverage and the traditional
portrayal of this conflict in literature tends to differ significantly from the lived
situation on the ground, zeroing in on particular events, failing to cover others,
and providing one-sided interpretations, which omit the multiplicity of
perspectives found in Israeli and Palestinian societies {Deadly Distortion,
2005).' In order to counter such myopic treatments of the conflict and to
illustrate altemative frameworks for "peace" pursued by nongovemmental
organizations, this article will provide a) an overview of official peacemaking
efforts, b) a discussion of varying Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on
"peace" and c) snapshots of a range of nonviolent civil society peacemaking
efforts that have continued despite the absence of official peace efforts.
TALKING ABOUT TALKING: THE OSLO "PEACE" PROCESS
The Oslo Accords were signed in 1993 by Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman
Yasser Arafat. The Accords were the result of secret back-channel negotiations
mediated by Norway and pre-empted the official negotiations that were
simultaneously being conducted under the auspices of the US State
Department.' Although the accords were widely heralded, they were also
widely misrepresented as a peace agreement; instead, the Oslo Accords
consisted of an exchange of letters of mutual recognition and a Declaration of
Principles (DoP) that established a "transitional period not exceeding five
years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338."' Thus, the Oslo agreement was not an agreement on "peace", but
an agreement to begin a process of negotiation in pursuit of "a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed
political process."'
Numerous factors contributed to the signing of the Oslo Accords,
including stmctural shifts from the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf
War. The Palestinian intifada, which began in December 1987 caught the PLO
leadership in exile by surprise, and Arafat perceived the rise in the unified local
leadership in the West Bank and Gaza as a potential threat to his authority.
Israeli leaders wished to end the uprising, which was expensive, caused
negative press (images of Palestinian youth with rocks against Israeli tanks),
and created security challenges. The Madrid Conference ( 1991 ) following the
Gulf War led to a series of bilateral negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians (officially part of the Jordanian delegation) as well as back-
channel talks, such as those in Oslo.'"
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Peace in the Making? The Content of the Oslo Accords
After the famous handshake on the White House Lawn, Israeli and
Palestinian negotiating teams reached several interim agreements, although
they made no progress on "final status" issues, which included borders,
security, water, settlements, reftigees, and the status of Jemsalem. The Oslo II
agreement ( 1995) created the Palestinian Interim Self-Govemment Authority
(PA) and divided the West Bank into areas A, B and C with varying degrees
of Palestinian and Israeli civil and security confrol." In total, this meant that
Palestinians confrolled about 7% of the territory in the West Bank, most of
which was non-contiguous.'^ Other agreements included the Hebron Protocol
( 1997) and the Wye River Memorandum ( 1998), which committed the parties
to implementing prior agreements and resulted in the redeployment of Israeli
troops from parts of Hebron, where several hundred Israeli Jewish settlers live
in the heart of the city of several hundred thousand Palestinians.
For all intents and purposes, the Oslo process ended with the Camp
David summit between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian
President Yasser Arafat in July 2000. Barak .sought to end the interim period
and the Oslo redeployment process by presenting a final offer to the
Palestinians (and the Israeli public) prior to elections. While Barak went farther
than any previous Israeli leader (who refused to discuss any of the final status
issues, particularly Jemsalem), Israel was to annex large settlement blocks,
retain control of water resources, bypass roads, airspace and borders.
Furthermore, Palestinians were divided into three major canton blocks,
autonomy in Jemsalem was limited, and there was no mention of the
Palestinian refugee issue. The talks ended in disaster, and US President Bill
Clinton joined with Israel in blaming Arafat for rejecting what became knowTi
as "Barak's generous offer."'^  Although the Al-Aqsa, or second, intifada began
after Ariel Sharon's confroversial visit to the Temple Mount/Haram esh-Sharif
on September 28, 2000, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators met in Taba in
January 2001 to move forward from where they had left off at Camp David.
There, Clinton presented his "parameters" for a negotiated two-state solution,
which included proposed processes (not specific formulations) conceming the
exchange of land, the Palestinian refugee question, and the final status of
Jemsalem.'"
Neither "peace" nor "process": problems with the Oslo Accords
One of the major problems with the Oslo Accords was the general
misconception that they represented a peace agreement, rather than agreement
on an interim process that might lead to final status negotiations on the core
.confiict issues. From the beginning, the Oslo Accords highlighted the
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"asymmetry" of the confiict. Israel is a sovereign state with a developed
economy and the fourth largest military in the worid, has the backing ofthe
world's sole remaining superpower, and boasts an infiuential Jewish Diaspora.
In contrast, Palestinians lack statehood, are impoverished, and lack a military,
though there is a substantial, but largely disenfranchised, Palestinian Diaspora.
The letters of "mutual recognition" exchanged between Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman
Yasser Arafat as part ofthe Oslo Accords refiect this asymmetry. The PLO
recognized the State of Israel's right "to exist in peace and security," affirmed
its commitment to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (the basis for
a two-state solution), committed itself to the peace process, and renounced
terrorism. In contrast, the brief letter from Yitzhak Rabin states: "...in light of
the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Govemment of Israel has
decided to recognize the PLO as the representative ofthe Palestinian people
and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace
process"." What is more, Rabin does not mention UN resolutions, Palestinian
statehood, or a commitment to negotiations. This asymmetry was aggravated
by the fact that the Palestinian negotiators had been living in exile and were
ignorant ofthe situation on the ground.
Although there is no Palestinian state, the intemational community has
largely used an inter-state confiict resolution framework for addressing the
confiict, overlooking inter-group confiict dynamics (Barak, 2005). Because of
the secrecy ofthe negotiations, the Israeli and Palestinian publics were neither
adequately involved in nor prepared for the compromises necessary in the
pursuit of peace. Consequently, spoilers existed in both communities, and
extremist violence (such as the 1994 massacre of praying Muslims by settler
Baruch Goldstein or the suicide bombings carried out by Hamas) posed an
obstacle to implementing agreements. The interim, phased approach of Oslo
did not build trust, as Israel escalated settlement construction to create "facts
on the ground'"" and the PA did not fully reign in militants. These trends,
combined with the institution of checkpoints and road blocks, which numbered
in the hundreds during the second intifada, contributed to skepticism regarding
the prospect of peace. ' '
The Palestinian Authority was often treated as if it were a state, yet
many Palestinians saw the PA as an agent of Israel, created by the Oslo
Accords to circumvent the Palestinian Diaspora. Its powers were limited by
Israel, most importantly in the financial sector. Israel, fof instance, controlled
tax revenues collected from Palestinians, which it then released to the PA for
use in paying salaries. From an economic standpoint, the PA, whose duties
included such things as arresting militants, as well as providing health,
education, and sanitation services, were more cost effective for Israel, thereby
decreasing the price of its occupation of Palestinian lands. Although the PA
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was designed to be an "interim" govemment, the interim period extended
beyond the five-year mark without any provision for new elections."
Palestinians and Israelis alike were fhistrated with the ineptitude and
cormption of the PA, yet interpreted it differently. For Israel, it demonstrated
the lack of a real partner for peace, and for Palestinians, it showed the PA was
simply another form of occupation. This example illustrates a broader problem
with Oslo and its aftermath: Palestinians and Israelis tend to have very different
conceptions regarding the roots of the conflict and the parameters of "peace".
The next section will explore some of these differences.
CONTENDING CONCEPTIONS OF CONFLICT & "PEACE"
Palestinians and Israelis experience the confiict in different ways,
which affects their definition of "peace". Peace and confiict resolution scholars
and practitioners often distinguish between "negative" peace (the absence of
war or armed violence) and "positive" peace (the presence of freedom, equity,
satisfaction of basic needs)." Israelis tend to emphasize the need for "peace
with security" (negative peace), due to the threat of suicide attacks, Oassam
rocket bombardments, and its history of regional confiict. Israel's conditioning
of negotiations on an end of Palestinian violence also illustrates its focus on
negative peace. Palestinians, in contrast, call for "peace with justice" (positive
peace), inasmuch as they experience the confiict in terms of a lack of self-
determination (freedom)^" and the socio-economic and political hardships of
living under Israeli military occupation. Because of the very different socio-
political conditions in which Israelis and Palestinians live and the rival views
of the Palestinian stmggle for self-determination, Palestinian and Israelis have
tended to define peace and conflict resolution efforts differently .^ ' This reflects
a divide between peace studies, which tends to focus on nonviolent social
change in the pursuit of justice and which occasionally leads to an increase in
"confiict", and confiict resolution, which aims to reduce violent confiict, and
may privilege status quo power relations by focusing on overt rather than
"structural" or "latent" disputes."
Palestinian Perspectives on "Peace"
For many Palestinians, the Oslo Accords were not a victory for peace,
but rather a legitimation of Israel's occupation. Cormpt PA officials, many of
whom retumed to the West Bank after years of exile, were recognized by their
fancy cars. Because many Palestinians equated the Oslo "peace" process with
a worsening social, economic and political situation, the word "peace" had
been sullied within the Palestinian context. Many Palestiniems felt they were:
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cheated by the word "peace," which hasn't meant justice for
Palestinians...while the whole world was talking about
peace [during Oslo], the Palestinian economy was going
downhill, checkpoints were being instigated, homes
demolished, settlements built. So Palestinians believe that
they were misled by this peace process, and that the Israeli
peace groups were in it for how it would benefit them,
without achieving justice and freedom and an end to
occupation.^^
This experience has led to an avoidance of the word "peace" to describe
Palestinian organizations and activities that might be labeled as such elsewhere.
To further compound this disfrust of "peace" initiatives, U.S. President George
W. Bush called Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, known for his role in the
1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres, a "man of peace" in 2004.
Rather than talk about "peace," some Palestinians emphasize those
aspects of their history related to nonviolent resistance against Israeli
occupation and their rejection of arms in the quest for freedom. This resistance
comes in a variety of forms, including ttying to build a sustainable economy in
the face of military occupation and attempting to maintain dignity despite the
humiliation suffered at checkpoints.^" In the Palestinian context, peace and
confiict resolution work entails nonviolent efforts toward ending the confiict,
often including "...consciousness-raising activify, human rights advocacy,
dialogue, and the provision of services intended to familiarize others to the
Palestinian concem for justice."" Palestinians pursue peace through seeking
justice; they assert that peace requires an end to Israel's occupation. For many,
this means eschewing cooperation with Israelis who do not openly speak
against the occupation because they view such relationships—between
occupier and occupied—as inherently unequal and contrary to peacebuilding.
Israeli Perspectives on "Peace"
Although in the wake of the second intifada "peace" is also seen as
a dirfy word by many Israelis, the Oslo Accords were seen as a success by the
mainstream Israeli peace movement as it recognized the PLO and affirmed the
two-state solution.^" For Israelis, peace means secure borders without the threat
of terrorism or invasion, as well as normal relations with all its neighbors. The
mainstream Israeli peace movement as epitomized by Peace Now, has tended
to be strongly Zionistic with close ties to the Israeli militaty. In confrast to
peace movements in other parts of the world, which tend to focus on
"universal" principles, including those of liberty, equality, and.human rights,
the Israeli peace movement has tended to be more "particular" or ethnocenfric
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because the goal of the two-state solution is to preserve Israel's Jewish
majority. '^ Furthermore, Israeli "peace" activism in Israel is generally distinct
from movements for economic and social justice, even though the "radical"
peace movement '^ is working to highlight the socio-economic implications of
Israel's occupation and settlement policies.^ ^ Mainstream Israeli peace activists
often seek recognition of Israel from their Palestinian counterparts and believe
joint activities form the basis for friendship and peace; they often see
Palestinian boycotts as contrary to the spirit of peacemaking and an indication
of rejectionism.
Peace work in Israel is often divided into two camps: those focusing
on matters related to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and those emphasizing issues
associated with the 1967 Six-Day War. After 1948, a number of Palestinian
Arabs remained in what became Israel; they now have Israeli citizenship and
account for 20% of Israel's population. A number of organizations work on
Arab-Jewish relations within Israel, some focus on "coexistence" and micro-
level problems of fear, hatred, and negative stereotypes, while others address
the cultural and socio-economic inequalities between Arabs and Jews and
struggle for full civic equality. For the other camp of Israeli peacemakers, the
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 is an important issue, for
it has provided the Israeli govemment with a bargaining chip with which it
might exchange "land for peace." For most Israelis, the stmggle with
Palestinians dwelling in the Occupied Territories is distinct from their conflict
with Arabs living within the 1948 boundaries, although this is starting to
change.
Overall, the Oslo years were positive for Israel. It experienced
economic benefits from "peace" with increased tourism and increased trade
partnerships. Most thought that peace had arrived, and thus there was little
effort on the part of mainstream peace movements to encourage the Israeli
govemment to fulfill its obligations under the Oslo.'" The failed Camp David
summit and the collapse of joint initiatives were seen as evidence that
Palestinians could not be regarded as tme partners for peace (IPCRI, 2002).
Partly due to this understanding, Israel has undertaken a policy of unilateral
separation as evidenced in the building of the "security fence" '^ and the 2005
disengagement from Gaza. Such policies highlight the orientation toward
negative peace, and ignore issues of stmctural violence. Likewise, calls by the
current Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, for an "economic peace"
highlights a significant difference between Israeli and Palestinian
understandings of the conflict; the plan would delay discussion of political
issues until after economic improvement, and it ignores the stmctural
impediments to economic growth (such as roadblocks, the lack of border
control, etc). This approach has been criticized by some in the Israeli peace
movement for (falsely) assuming that Palestinians with "ftill stomachs" will be
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more politically moderate."
OFFICIAL PEACEMAKING EFFORTS IN THE
WAKE OF OSLO'S FAILURE
Several peace initiatives have occurred since the Oslo Accords,
although none has maintained momentum. For example, the Geneva Accord
(2003), sponsored by the Geneva Initiative, was a Track II (unofficial)
initiative drafted by high level Israelis and Palestinians with experience in
govemment. Like the Oslo Accords, the Geneva Initiative aimed at a two-state
solution; unlike Oslo, the Geneva Initiative sought to address the permanent
status issues like borders, Jemsalem, refugees, and settlements that had evaded
Oslo negotiators." The Geneva Initiative sought to provide a model from
which govemment officials could negotiate and to demonstrate that there was
a partner on the other side of the Green Line (the border between Israel proper
and the Occupied Territories).
The Arab Peace Initiative, endorsed by the Arab League in March
2002, was drafted by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (then crown prince). The
Arab Peace Initiative was overshadowed by a suicide bombing that occurred
the same day in Netanya, and by Israel's subsequent reinvasion of the West
Bank on March 29 in Operation "Defensive Shield." In March 2007 the Arab
League fully re-endorsed the plan, which calls for fiill normalization of
relations with Israel in exchange for a retum to the 1967 borders and a just
solution for the Palestinian refugees. The official Israeli response has been to
acknowledge the general spirit of the plan, but to reject the specific call for
repatriation of Palestinian refugees." Again, dissimilar understandings of peace
and conflict pose major obstacles to the Arab Peace Initiative. For the Arab
League, peaceful coexistence and the normalization of relations with Israel
will, it is hoped, result from an Israeli withdrawal; for Israel, peace and
normalization are the prerequisites for such action.
The Performance-Based Road Map for Peace (2003) and the
Annapolis Conference (November 2007) have been criticized for being limited
in their aims and for lacking implementation and enforcement mechanisms. The
Road Map sought "a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestine
conflict by 2005" and specified the goal of a Palestinian state, albeit with
"provisional" borders." Like Oslo, the Road Map emphasized the need for
Palestinians to end violence and to dismantle the terrorist infrastmcture and for
Israelis to end settlement construction: however, obligations and timetables
were not enforced. The Annapolis conference was an effort to revive the Road
Map, which had never progressed beyond Phase I (which includes an end to
Palestinian violence, Palestinian political reform and Israeli withdrawal and
freeze on settlement expansion) and to support Palestinian President Mahmoud
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Abbas after Hamas took over control ofthe Gaza Strip in June 2007.'" Despite
intensive meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams over
several months, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Abbas failed
to reach any declaration of principles on final status issues." Instead, an
ambitious "joint understanding" sought to reach a bilateral agreement by the
end of 2008. Both leaders, however, faced significant domestic political
constraints, not to mention the continued lack of ability to implement Phase I
of the Road Map obligations, a pre-requisite for implementing any peace
agreement.
WORKING FOR PEACE IN TIMES OF CONFLICT
Despite peacemaking challenges at the official level, including
distrust, different strategic interests, and domestic political challenges," some
Israelis and Palestinians have continued to work across the socio-political
divide for a just, lasting, and secure peace. These activists face many obstacles,
including the difficulty for Israelis and Palestinians to meet in person—Israeli
law prohibits Israeli citizens from entering Palestinian controlled areas and it
is extremely difficult for Palestinians to obtain permits to enter Israel.
Furthermore, Palestinians and Israelis face considerable domestic or "intemal"
challenges, including being seen as a "collaborator" or a "traitor". Some
nonviolent activists have been killed by the Israeli militiuy, others seriously
injured, and many more arrested." Divides within the peace movement and the
obstacles posed by the govemment and military also hamper activism.
Peace activism comes in a wide range of forms; the Multi-track
diplomacy model, for example, identifies nine such "tracks" that interact for the
purpose of peace."" Given space limitations, only a few types of initiatives will
be discussed here, i.e., those related to problem-solving (Track II), human
rights and intemational law, coexistence, and nonviolent action. For each case,
the basic premises ofthe model will be briefiy summarized and a contemporary
Israeli-Palestinian example will be given.
Problem-solving/Track II
Problem-solving workshops are a type of "second track" or "citizen's"
diplomacy, which brings together infiuential representatives of communities in
confiict who lack official status to work together to identify the underlying
conflict dynamics and devise strategies to address them."' One of the basic
premises of such workshops is that by improving communication between the
parties and by building human connections, a constituency for peace is
developed, one that can hopefully leverage support for official level
negotiations. Over the decades, numerous problem-solving workshops have
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sought either to create the pre-conditions for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations or
to inject new ideas into a stalled process."^ The Oslo Accords, for example,
were built on second track connections."'
Bringing Peace Together (BPT) began in 2004 in an effort to bring
together representatives of the mainstream, pragmatic Israeli and Palestinian
peace movements. The goal was to coordinate the efforts among the
organizations due in part to the small number of members in each group and
also to enhance communication between the groups, which was often lacking.
At its meetings, BPT examines contemporary issues from a variety of Israeli
and Palestinian perspectives, seeking common ground from which to devise
policy options and negotiating stt-ategies. The year after the Annapolis
Conference, it organized a major conference to review possibilities for
reaching a peace agreement."" The group continues to meet several times ayear
to engage in dialogue on key policy issues and to strategize as to how to best
influence their respective govemments and civil societies in pursuit of a lasting
peace agreement.
Human-rights and international law
The human rights and intemational law approach to peace emphasizes
the importance of justice in preventing war and violence as well as the use of
legal mechanisms to manage conflict nonviolently. Groups such as Rabbis for
Human Rights, Machsom (Checkpoint) Watch, B'Tselem, and al-Haq use
standards of human rights and humanitarian law in an effort to end egregious
abuses that ftiel confiict and harm Palestinian and Israeli society. Intemational
law, such as the Geneva Conventions, is also employed to challenge Israel's
occupation of the Palestinian Territories, which peace groups identify as a
major source of the on-going conflict."' For human rights activists, the
integration of human rights standards into the Israeli and Palestinian judicial
systems is critical for a just, lasting, and secure peace because when people are
confident in the judicial process and accept the mle of law, they are less likely
to use violence to achieve "justice".
Intemational law has been critical to efforts addressing the on-going
humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, especially after Israel implemented a
policy of siege after the 2006 Palestinian elections. Israeli and Palestinian
activists have highlighted the inconsistencies between Israeli claims and
intemational standards of human rights and humanitarian law by documenting
cases, writing reports, filing court petitions, and organizing aid convoys. For
example, activists have challenged Israel's claim that Gaza is no longer
occupied by pointing to its contt-ol of all entty and exit points and its denial of
necessary supplies, including vital medicines, across the borders."* Groups like
Physicians for Human Rights-Israel have worked to secure visas for cancer
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patients and other critically ill Palestinians to access medical freatment in Israel
(Gaza's health system is inadequate), and in January 2008 a coalition of 26
Israeli organizations organized a relief convoy to protest Israel's blockade.
Parallel rallies were held on either side of the border although no people or
goods were allowed to cross."' Israeli and Palestinian politicians, joumalists,
and civil sociefy leaders have sailed with the Free Gaza movement from Cypms
to Gaza in order to raise awareness about the dire conditions in Gaza and break
the siege. During the intense confiict from December 27, 2008-January 18,
2009 Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations worked together to
collect information and to appeal to the intemational community through blogs,
press releases, and meetings with officials; since then they have pushed for an
independent investigation into human rights violations,""
Co-existence
Coexistence efforts focus on humanizing the "Other", and building
relationships as the foundation of peace between competing people groups.
Given that 20% of Israel's population is Arab Palestinian, coexistence
activities have long occurred within 1948 Israel as well as between Israeli
citizens and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, Within Israel, Arabs and
Jews attend separate schools and generally live in different communities.
Prominent Israeli politicians, such as the current Foreign Minister Avigdor
Lieberman, openly advocate the fransfer of Israel's Arab citizens to the
Palestinian Territories."' However, initiatives like the Hand-in-Hand school,
which teaches Arab and Jewish students together in both Hebrew and Arabic,
or the intentional Arab-Jewish village Neve Shalom-Wahat al Salaam, seek to
build bridges rather than walls.'" Across the Green Line, groups such as the
Bereaved Families Fomm (close family members lost to the confiict), and
Combatants for Peace (former Israeli soldiers and former Palestinian militants)
have demonstrated the power of jointly organizing their forces. The latter has
particularly made excellent use of mobilizing its members' "patriot" status in
the cause of peace. Organizations such as these work within their own societies
as well as across national boundaries to humanize the other, share both
narratives, and build a culture of nonviolence,"
Nonviolent Action
Those engaging in nonviolent action seek to re-arrange power
relations within sociefy so as to better ensure justice and equalify. Nonviolent
activism puts power in the hands of the weak by allowing them to withdraw
their consent from laws, policies, and authorities deemed unjust or (morally)
illegitimate; it can be a strategic or spiritual choice," Although Palestinians are
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portrayed as terrorists in the Westem media, they have a long tradition of
nonviolent activism that often goes unnoticed in the press. Israeli and
Palestinian organizations have stmggled against Israeli policies of home
demolition and restrictions on freedom of movement; they have stood in front
of bulldozers, organized strikes, and dismantled roadblocks. After the outbreak
of the second intifada, Ta'ayush (Arab-Jewish partnership) joined with local
Palestinian groups in large demonstrations and other activities aimed at ending
violence and building peace." Villagers across the West Bank, often joined by
Israeli activists, have demonstrated against the wall, which separates farmers
from their land; Bil'in has not only engaged in over four years of weekly
protest, but has organized intemational conferences on nonviolent stmggle as
well.'"
Israeli conscientious objection to military service is another form of
nonviolent action. This has many different levels, from those refusing to serve
in the occupied territories (like Yesh Gvul) to those refusing to service in the
military at all (like the Shministim).'"^ Not only can refusal result in a prison
term, but because army service is a central component of Israeli identity—and
a pre-requisite for many jobs and socio-economic benefits—it creates
significant challenges. Israeli and Palestinian activists also protest Israel's
economic occupation through projects like Who Profits from the Occupation,
a website run by the Israeli Coalition of Women for Peace
(http://wvkfw.whoprofits.org/), and the boycott of settlement products organized
by Gush Shalom (http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/campaigns/boycott_
settlements_products/). These websites document industries, products, and
services benefiting from the on-going Israeli occupation and advocate
consumer action. Although it is more controversial, some Israelis and
Palestinians promote a more comprehensive boycott campaign targeting Israel
akin to that used against apartheid South Africa. "
CONCLUSION
Although in 2009 the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems increasingly
intractable at the official level, with a right-wing Israeli govemment led by
Benjamin Netanyahu and deeply divided rival Palestinian govemments, there
are Israelis and Palestinians who continue to put themselves on the line for a
nonviolent resolution of the conflict and a just, secure, and lasting peace
agreement. Despite images portrayed in the Westem media, both Israeli and
Palestinian societies are highly diverse; a number of peace activists from each
society have noted that they often have more in common with their fellow
activists on the "other" side than they do with some in their own society. What
these activists share is a dedication to nonviolence and equality, an
acknowledgement of the pain suffered by the "Other," and ; a long-term
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commitment to struggle despite the many challenges.
A peaceful resolution of the conflict requires honoring the narratives
of both peoples and finding a way for justice, security, and recognition for all.
Support for Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers confributes to the bottom-up
peacemaking that must accompany any successful top-down diplomatic
process. The Oslo process demonstrated that without civil society engagement
and public support, official agreements will not be implemented by politicians
interested in short term gains. At the same time, strong leadership is needed to
make tough decisions and to guide the populace along the appropriate path to
reconciliation. Activists such as those discussed here have demonstrated that
there is in fact a partner for peace on both sides of the Green Line; the way is
not easy, but it is possible.
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